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Argentina Agonistes
Since December 2001, Argentina has experienced a
tumultuous currency devaluation, sovereign debt default,
and a freeze on bank accounts that followed a ten-year
period in which the Argentine peso was tied one-to-one
with the U.S. dollar. During this era, Argentina took
steps to privatize state-owned enterprises and open itself
to international trade—especially with Brazil, which
became Argentina’s largest trading partner through the
Mercosur customs union. In the 1990s, foreign companies
purchased numerous privatized enterprises and foreign
investors acquired large holdings of private and sovereign
debt from Argentina. For these foreign owners to repa-
triate interest and profits, Argentina would have to gener-
ate substantial export earnings.
However, one big obstacle to Argentine exports was
the appreciation of the dollar, and thus the peso, against
other major currencies, starting in 1995. That is, prices
in Argentina—combined with the one-to-one exchange
rate with the dollar—made Argentine goods relatively
expensive to the rest of the world. Argentina and Brazil
were at least in the same boat during the mid-1990s when
Brazil was also pegging to the U.S. dollar. In contrast
to the European Union, however, the Mercosur customs
union did not impose exchange-rate commitments
between the member countries, and Brazil unilaterally
devalued the real in January 1999. Depreciation of the
nominal exchange rate would have been the most direct
way for Argentina also to reduce the high real exchange
value of the peso. With the exchange-rate straitjacket in
place, however, the only way market forces could reduce
the real exchange value of the peso was for prices in
Argentina to fall relative to prices in the United States.
But it was not easy for prices in Argentina to ebb below
those in the United States, given the U.S. productivity
boom which held down U.S. inflation and elevated real
rates of return. 
With the fixed exchange rate, nominal interest rates in
Argentina could not fall below those in the United States,
although they could be higher due to default risk. This
interest-rate floor meant that any fall in prices in Argentina
relative to the United States implied correspondingly
higher real borrowing costs in Argentina’s domestic credit
markets. Between November 1994 and September 2001,
for example, the price level in Argentina fell 16.2 percent
relative to the price level in the United States. The result-
ing high real borrowing costs hindered any economic
recovery that would have reduced Argentina’s unemploy-
ment rate from double-digit levels. Nevertheless, the
accompanying chart shows that not even this painful
decrease in relative prices between Argentina and the
United States was sufficient to prevent substantial appreci-
ation of the real exchange value of the peso relative to the
Brazilian real following Brazil’s devaluation in January
1999. This evolution of the Argentine economy—one
step forward and two steps backward—satisfied no con-
stituency: not domestic borrowers, labor unions, exporters,
or foreign creditors. In such circumstances, domestic
politics generally holds the trump card, whereupon default
and devaluation became the inevitable outcome.
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NOTE: 1995 index = 100; higher values indicate that Argentine 
exports are more expensive.